In the
1930s Joseph Stalin became increasingly
concerned that the Soviet Union would be invaded by Germany. Stalin
believed the best way to of dealing with Germany was to form an anti-fascist
alliance with countries in the west. Stalin argued that even Adolf
Hitler would not start a war against a united Europe.
Neville
Chamberlain, the British prime minister, was not enthusiastic
about forming an alliance with the Soviet Union. He wrote to a friend:
"I must confess to the most profound distrust of Russia. I have
no belief whatever in her ability to maintain an effective offensive,
even if she wanted to. And I distrust her motives, which seem to me
to have little connection with our ideas of liberty, and to be concerned
only with getting everyone else by the ears."
Winston
Churchill, an outspoken critic of British foreign policy, agreed
with Joseph Stalin: "There is no
means of maintaining an eastern front against Nazi aggression without
the active aid of Russia. Russian interests are deeply concerned in
preventing Herr Hitler's designs on eastern Europe. It should still
be possible to range all the States and peoples from the Baltic to
the Black sea in one solid front against a new outrage of invasion.
Such a front, if established in good heart, and with resolute and
efficient military arrangements, combined with the strength of the
Western Powers, may yet confront Hitler, Goering, Himmler, Ribbentrop,
Goebbels and co. with forces the German people would be reluctant
to challenge."
Stalin's
own interpretation of Britain's rejection of his plan for an antifascist
alliance, was that they were involved in a plot with Germany against
the Soviet Union. This belief was reinforced when Neville
Chamberlain met with Adolf Hitler
at Munich in September, 1938, and gave into his demands for the Sudetenland
in Czechoslovakia. Joseph Stalin now believed
that the main objective of British foreign policy was to encourage
Germany to head east rather than west.
Stalin
realized that war with Germany was inevitable. However, to have any
chance of victory he needed time to build up his armed forces. The
only way he could obtain time was to do a deal with Hitler. Stalin
was convinced that Hitler would not be foolish enough to fight a war
on two fronts. If he could persuade Hitler to sign a peace treaty
with the Soviet Union, Germany was likely to invade Western Europe
instead.
On 3rd
May, 1939, Stalin dismissed Maxim Litvinov,
his Jewish
Commissar
for Foreign Affairs. Litvinov had been closely associated with the
Soviet Union's policy of an antifascist alliance. Meetings soon took
place between Vyacheslav
Molotov,
Litvinov's replacement and Joachim von
Ribbentrop, the German foreign minister. On 28th August, 1939,
the Nazi-Soviet Pact was signed in Moscow.
Under the terms of the agreement, both countries promised to remain
neutral if either country became involved in a war.
(1)
David Low, What, no chair for me? (30th September,
1938)
(1)
Neville
Chamberlain, letter to a friend (26th March, 1939)
I must
confess to the most profound distrust of Russia. I have no belief
whatever in her ability to maintain an effective offensive, even if
she wanted to. And I distrust her motives, which seem to me to have
little connection with our ideas of liberty, and to be concerned only
with getting everyone else by the ears. Moreover, she is both hated
and suspected by many of the smaller States, notably by Poland, Rumania
and Finland.
(2)
On 16th April, 1939, the Soviet Union suggested a three-power military
alliance with Great Britain and France. In a speech on 4th May, Winston
Churchill urged the government to accept the offer.)
Ten or
twelve days have already passed since the Russian offer was made.
The British people, who have now, at the sacrifice of honoured, ingrained
custom, accepted the principle of compulsory military service, have
a right, in conjunction with the French Republic, to call upon Poland
not to place obstacles in the way of a common cause. Not only must
the full co-operation of Russia be accepted, but the three Baltic
States, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, must also be brought into association.
To these three countries of warlike peoples, possessing together armies
totalling perhaps twenty divisions of virile troops, a friendly Russia
supplying munitions and other aid is essential.
There is
no means of maintaining an eastern front against Nazi aggression without
the active aid of Russia. Russian interests are deeply concerned in
preventing Herr Hitler's designs on eastern Europe. It should still
be possible to range all the States and peoples from the Baltic to
the Black sea in one solid front against a new outrage of invasion.
Such a front, if established in good heart, and with resolute and
efficient military arrangements, combined with the strength of the
Western Powers, may yet confront Hitler, Goering, Himmler, Ribbentrop,
Goebbels and co. with forces the German people would be reluctant
to challenge.
(3)
Winston Churchill,
speech in the House of Commons (19th May,
1939)
Undoubtedly,
the proposals put forward by the Russian Government contemplate a
triple alliance against aggression between England, France and Russia,
which alliance may extend its benefits to other countries of and when
those benefits are desired. The alliance is solely for the purpose
of resisting further acts of aggression and of protecting the victims
of aggression. I cannot see what is wrong with that. What is wrong
with this simple proposal? It is said: "Can you trust the Russian
Soviet Government?" I suppose in Moscow they say: "Can we
trust Chamberlain?" I hope we may say that the answer to both
questions is in the affirmative. I earnestly hope so.
Clearly
Russia is not going to enter into agreements unless she is treated
as an equal, and not only is treated as an equal, but has confidence
that the methods employed by the Allies - by the peace front - are
such as would be likely to lead to success. No one wants to associate
themselves with indeterminate leadership and uncertain policies. The
Government must realise that none of these States in Eastern Europe
can maintain themselves for, say, a year's war unless they have behind
them the massive, solid backing of a friendly Russia, joined to the
combination of the Western Powers. In the main, I agree with Mr. Lloyd
George that if there is to be an effective eastern front - an eastern
peace front, or a war front as it might become - it can be set up
only with the effective support of a friendly Soviet Russia lying
behind all those countries.
(4)
in August 1939, Joachim von Ribbentrop
arranged the signing of the Nazi-Soviet Pact.
To seek
a settlement with Russia was my very own idea which I urged on Hitler
because I sought to create a counter-weight to the West and because
I wanted to ensure Russian neutrality in the event of a German-Polish
conflict.
After a
short ceremonial welcome the four of us sat down at a table: Stalin,
Molotov, Count Schulenburg and myself. Others present were our interpreter,
Hilger, a great expert on Russian affairs, and a young fair-haired
Russian interpreter, Pavlov, who seemed to enjoy Stalin's special
trust.
Stalin
spoke - briefly, precisely, without many words; but what he said was
clear and unambiguous and showed that he, too, wished to reach a settlement
and understanding with Germany. Stalin used the significant phrase
that although we had 'poured buckets of filth' over each other for
years there was no reason why we should not make up our quarrel.
(5)
The day after he signed the Nazi-Soviet Pact, Joseph
Stalin explained to Lavrenti Beria,
his Commissioner for Internal Affairs, why he had reached an agreement
with Hitler.
Of course,
it's all a game to see who can fool whom. I know what Hitler's up
to. He thinks he's outsmarted me, but actually it's I who have tricked
him.
(6)
Willy
Brandt, Det Zoda Arhundre
(January, 1940)
The attitude of the socialist
movement towards the Soviet Union today must be considered against
this background. Relations have changed almost beyond recognition.
It is hardly a novel situation to find the leaders of the Soviet Union
in a state of outright war against the socialist movement. It has
happened before. But today the whole movement is obliged to stand
up and fight, and draw a clear dividing line between itself and the
Soviet Union. It is not the socialist movement but the Soviet Union
which has changed. It is not the socialist movement but the Soviet
Union which has entered a pact of friendship with Nazism. It is the
Soviet Union which stabbed Poland in the back and initiated the war
against Finland.
(7)
William
Joyce,
Germany Calling (23rd June, 1941)
When in August, 1939, Hitler
made a pact of friendship with Stalin, some of you may have wondered
if Hitler had betrayed western civilisation. Yesterday in his proclamation,
the Führer was able to speak openly for the first time. He said
that it was with a heavy heart that he sent his Foreign Minister to
Moscow. England left him no other choice. She had worked hard throughout
the summer of 1939 to build up a coalition against Germany. Hitler
was compelled in self-defence to conclude a pact of friendship with
Russia in which the signatories agreed not to attack each other and
defined spheres of interest.
(8)
Nikita Khrushchev was the secretary
of the Moscow Regional Committee in 1939. Khrushchev who was with
Stalin when the Nazi-Soviet Pact was signed, wrote about these events
in his autobiography, Khrushchev Remembers (1971)
I believe
the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact of 1939 was historically inevitable, given
the circumstances of the time, and that in the final analysis it was
profitable for the Soviet Union. It was like a gambit in chess: if
we hadn't made that move, the war would have started earlier, much
to our disadvantage. It was very hard for us - as Communists, as anti-fascists
- to accept the idea of joining forces with Germany. It was difficult
enough for us to accept the paradox ourselves.
For their
part, the Germans too were using the treaty as a maneuver to win time.
Their idea was to divide and conquer the nations which had united
against Germany in World War I and which might united against Germany
again. Hitler wanted to deal with his adversaries one at a time. He
was convinced that Germany had been defeated in World war I because
he tried to fight on two fronts at once. The treaty he signed with
us was his way of trying to limit the coming war to one front.
(9)
Isaac Deutscher, Stalin
(1949)
In the
course of two meetings in the Kremlin, on the evening of 23 August
and late the same night, the partners thrashed out the main issues
of "common interest" and signed a pact of non-aggression
and a "secret additional protocol". Stalin could not have
had the slightest doubt that the pact at once relieved Hitler of the
nightmare of a war on two fronts, and that to that extent it unleashed
the Second World War. Yet he, Stalin, had no qualms. To his mind the
war was inevitable anyhow; if he had made no deal with Hitler, war
wound still have broken out either now or somewhat later, under conditions
incomparably less favourable to his country. His purpose now was to
win time, time, and once again time, to get on with his economic plans,
to build up Russia's might and then throw that might into the scales
when the other belligerents were on their last legs.
Available
from Amazon Books (order below)
